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Abstract
I study a budget-constrained, private-valuation, sealed-bid sequential auction with two
incompletely-informed, risk-neutral bidders in which the valuations and income may be
non-monotonic functions of a bidder's type. Multiple equilibrium symmetric bidding func-
tions may exist that dier in allocation, eciency and revenue. The sequence of sale aects
the competition for a good and therefore also aects revenue and the prices of each good
in a systematic way that depends on the relationship among the valuations and incomes
of bidders. The sequence of sale may aect prices and revenue even when the number of
bidders is large relative to the number of goods. If a particular good, say , is allocated
to a strong bidder independent of the sequence of sale, then auction revenue and the price
of good  are higher when good  is sold rst.
Keywords: sequential auctions, budget constraints, eciency, revenue, price, se-
quence.
JEL Classication: C7, C72, L1
1 Introduction
Much of the existing theoretical work on auctions concentrates on the allocation of a single good.1
However, in actual auctions, several heterogeneous goods are often allocated sequentially. If there
is no link among the goods then one may be able to apply the single-good analysis repeatedly.
However, such a link may arise if budget constraints limit a bidder's ability to bid for later goods
when earlier prices deplete the bidder's limited resources.
Please send correspondence to Prof. C. Pitchik, Dept. of Economics, University of Toronto, 150 St. George
St., Toronto, M5S 3G7, Canada, Internet: pitchik@chass.utoronto.ca, Telephone +1-(416)-978-5249, Fax +1-
(416)-978-6713. I thank Paul Klemperer, Preston McAfee, Martin J. Osborne, Mike Peters, Andrew Schotter,
Ralph Winter and two referees for helpful comments, insights and discussions. I gratefully acknowledge nancial
support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
yhttp://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws home/622836/description#description
1For a survey of the literature, see Klemperer (1999).
1Individual bidders whose valuations derive from consumption (rather than resale) may be
budget-constrained. But the relevance of budget constraints extends well beyond this case.
A theoretical literature argues generally that the existence of agency problems implies that
rms are eectively budget-constrained in their investment decisions.2 An empirical literature
supports this idea.3 In the context of auctions, even rms that are buying to re-sell may
eectively be budget-constrained if the cost of borrowing increases with the amount borrowed4
(a standard assumption in the nance literature) or if capital market imperfections result in
budgets for projects being determined on a yearly basis, so that the rms allocate only a xed
amount of capital5 for the completion of a project. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) shows that
budget constraints arise if a bidder is an agent of a principal.
When investments are relatively large then capital market imperfections can lessen the ability
of even a large rm to borrow funds. The historic auction of radio spectrum by the FCC in the
USA is a good example of an auction in which the investments are relatively large. Cramton
(1994) nds it realistic to assume that all rms in PCS (personal communicating services)
auctions face budget constraints.6 As he explains, bidders must raise funds before the auction
starts when they do not know exactly how much they will need. Given that fund-raising is
time-consuming and costly, he argues that it is reasonable to assume that rms that come to
such auctions are budget-constrained. In addition, only forty per cent of the narrow band PCS
spectrum was for sale in the rst spectrum auction held by the FCC, so that, though each
spectrum auction was simultaneous, goods were allocated sequentially across auctions as well
as simultaneously within an auction.
I nd that the order of sale aects revenue in a private value budget-constrained sequential
auction with imperfect information in which bids are continuous. The order of sale aects
revenue and prices whether information is perfect and bids are discrete or whether information
is imperfect and bids are continuous. The intuition derives from the fact that once good 1 is
sold, there is an option to win good 2. The value of the option depends on demand for good 2
which in turn depends on the order of sale. Beno^ t and Krishna (1998) show that in a complete
information common value auction of two goods and three budget-constrained bidders, selling
the more highly valued good rst always generates the highest revenue. Their result extends
to two goods and n budget-constrained bidders since only the top three incomes are relevant.
However, it is easy to generate budget-constrained sequential common value auctions in which
2See Lewis and Sappington (1989a, 1989b), Hart and Moore (1995) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2003).
3See Fazzari and Athey (1987), Fazzari et. al. (1988), Whited (1992), Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Love
(2003) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2003) for empirical corroboration of budget constraints.
4See Cramton (1995) for a discussion of the budget constraints faced by rms making large investments in
the nationwide narrowband PCS auction held in the United States in July 1994.
5See Hendricks and Porter (1992) for empirical evidence of capital constraints in land lease auctions.
6As do Burguet and McAfee (2005).
2selling the most highly valued of three goods does not generate the highest revenue.7
The preceding paragraph illustrates that the relationship between the order of sale and
revenue is unclear. The question that I address in this paper is whether any systematic rules
govern the relationship among the prices of a good, the revenue, and the order of sale when the
valuations are similar and when the income exceeds the valuation of each good. In Section 7,
I provide a restricted set of auctions in which selling the more highly valued good rst raises
more revenue than selling it second.
I study a budget-constrained version of the benchmark model of a private-valuation sealed-
bid sequential auction in which two risk-neutral bidders bid for two goods and information is
incomplete.8 When information is complete, revenue is aected, in a systematic way,9 by the
price-formation rule (i.e. the rule that species the price as a function of the bids). Assuming
information is incomplete does not change this. In order to isolate the pure eect of the budget
constraints on the prices of goods relative to their order of sale and the price-formation rule, I
restrict to a world in which the expected revenue is constant within a class of price-formation
rules that includes 1st and 2nd price rules (as would happen if there were only a single good and
no eective budget constraints). In this world, I nd that the auction revenue depends on the
sequence of sale, that the price of a good depends on its position in the sequence of sale, and
that this dependence has a natural interpretation.
In a budget-constrained sequential auction of two goods in which a bidder's type determines
the value of the bidder's valuation and income functions, I restrict attention to symmetric
bidding functions but do not assume monotonicity in a bidder's type. I nd that multiple
symmetric equilibrium bidding functions may exist that dier with respect to eciency, revenue
and allocation. Whether revenue is maximized or the allocation is ecient depends on the
relationship between the bidding function and the valuation and income functions and not on
the price rule.
Say that two real-valued functions f and g are ordinally equivalent on a common domain S if
f(x) > f(y) if and only if g(x) > g(y) for any x;y 2 S (that is, they produce a common ranking of
the domain elements). Ordinal equivalence can be useful in determining whether an equilibrium
bidding function generates the highest revenue or an ecient outcome. An upper bound on
the revenue generated is that generated by any bidding function that is ordinally equivalent to
the income function (Theorem 2 and Corollary 3). An ecient allocation is generated if the
bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the dierence in valuation functions (Theorem 2 and
7Beno^ t and Krishna (1998).
8Beno^ t and Krishna (2000) consider budget constrained buyers with complete information. Che and Gale
(1993) consider budget constrained buyers in one-good auctions. Pitchik and Schotter (1986), Pitchik and
Schotter (1988) and Pitchik (1989) considers budget constrained buyers with incomplete information.
9See Beno^ t and Krishna (2000), Pitchik and Schotter (1988), and Pitchik and Schotter (1986).
3Corollary 3). In particular, if the valuation and income functions are increasing in a bidder's
type with one valuation function increasing more rapidly than the other, then, under rst or
second price rules, there exists an equilibrium bidding function that generates maximum revenue
and an ecient allocation when the good whose valuation increases more rapidly in a bidder's
type is sold rst. Thus, even when there are only two goods, selling the highest valued good
rst need not generate the highest revenue. In particular, if one is auctioning the contents of
a household, then selling a wall painting by an unknown artist (for whom bidders' tastes are
highly variable) before the used ride-on lawn mower (whose value may be high but publicly
known) maximizes revenue.
The price-formation rule may aect the price of a good even if it does not aect revenue
(Theorem 7). For example, under a second price rule, a bidder might worry about not being
awarded good 2 at a low price and so bid relatively high while, under a rst price rule a bidder
might worry about winning good 1 at a high price and so bid relatively low. In addition, auction
revenue and allocation may dier across symmetric equilibrium bidding functions (Theorem 2,
8, and 10, and Corollary 3).
The law of one price does not hold for similar goods in a budget-constrained sequential
auction (Theorems 4, 17, and 20, and Corollaries 5, 18, and 19). If the goods  and  are
identically valued and the bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the income function, then
the expected price is higher the later the good is sold. If the goods  and  are similarly valued
(with a common mean) but the value of one good is even slightly more variable than the other
and income is constant across types of bidders, then the expected price is higher the earlier the
good is sold under a 2nd price rule;10 under a 1st price rule, it is higher the later the good is sold.
In my model the goods may be heterogeneous. The revenue and the price of a good depend
on the order of sale and the interaction among the valuations and income of bidder types. Each
bidder obtains no more than one good in equilibrium, but the bidders are not constrained ex
ante from obtaining both goods independent of the prices and bids; further, bidders know their
valuations of both goods at the beginning of the auction. In addition, the valuations and income
may be non-monotonic in type.
Previous models in the literature11 use various assumptions to obtain the relationship be-
tween the price of a good and its order of sale so that the various results are hard to compare
within the context of a single model. When I restrict to similar goods in my model, the eect
of the order of sale on the price depends, in a systematic way, on the way that the order of sale
aects the opportunity cost of winning good one.
10Ashenfelter (1989) and Ashenfelter and Genesove (1993) provide empirical evidence that ex ante identical
goods fetch prices that depend on their position in the order of sale.
11Genesove (1993), Black and De Meza (1993), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) and Gale and Hausch (1992).
4Two previous models link revenue with the order of sale. Elmaghraby (2003) links revenue to
the order of sale when a buyer auctions two heterogeneous jobs to capacity-constrained suppliers.
Chakraborty et. al. (2006) obtain that the order of sale aects revenue when a seller may choose
which of two goods to sell rst based on her private information in the context of the standard
auction model in Milgrom and Weber (1982).
Other work deals with the allocation of multiple goods to multiple bidders, but none of
which I am aware specically analyzes the allocation of multiple goods auctioned sequentially to
a set of incompletely-informed, budget-constrained bidders with private valuations.12 The aim
of the paper is to understand how the relationship between auction revenue, allocation, prices
and the order of sale depends on the relationship among the parameters of the model and the
price-formation rule.
2 The Model
Two individuals, 1 and 2, bid for two heterogenous goods,  and . The goods are sold se-
quentially; I refer to the rst good sold as good 1. Each individual's privately known type is
drawn independently from the publicly known distribution H, which is atomless, continuously
dierentiable, and increasing on its support [0;1]. An individual of type t has income I(t) and
valuation v
(t) for good 
, for 
 = , . An individual of type t is constrained to pay no more
than I(t) in the auction. Thus, if an individual of type t obtains good 1 at the price p1, then
p1  I(t) and the individual can pay no more than I(t)   p1 for good 2.
I assume that the functions I : [0;1]  ! [a;b] and v
 : [0;1]  ! [a
;b
], 
 = ,  are
continuously dierentiable, with a  0 and a
  0 for 
 = , . I impose the mild condition
that on no set of positive Lebesgue measure is it the case that v0
1  v0
2 +I0 = 0 and v0
1  v0
2 = 0.
So, for example, if v1 and v2 dier by a constant on some interval then I is not constant on this
interval. Note that I do not impose monotonicity on v1, v2 or I.
Since I;v and v may not be monotonic, knowing the value I(t) of one's opponent's income
need not give any information about one's opponent's valuations v1(t) and v2(t). For example,
no information is given when the function I is constant on [0;1]. Note also that the income and
valuations of one individual are not correlated with those of any other.
In order that the valuations be meaningful I assume that for each type, income is at least
equal to each valuation; in order that the budget constraint be eective I assume that, for each
type, income is at most the sum of the valuations. Precisely,
v
(t)  I(t)  v(t) + v(t) for 
 = ; and t 2 [0;1], (1)
12See Beno^ t and Krishna (2000), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993), Bulow and Klemperer (2002), Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Weber (1979), Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Menezes (1993), Gale and Hausch (1992), Gale and
Stegeman (2001), Krishna (1990,1993), McAfee and Vincent (1993), Menezes (1993), Ortega-Reichert (1968),
Palfrey (1980), Pitchik and Schotter (1986,1987), von der Fehr (1994), Weber (1983) and Swinkels (1989).
5where the rst inequality is strict for t 2 (0;1).
This assumption has two implications. (1) The maximum amount that an individual of type
t is willing and able to pay for both goods simultaneously is I(t). (2) The maximum amount
that an individual of type t is willing and able to pay for good 2, once good 1 is sold, is the
minimum of v2(t) and any income remaining to the individual after payment for good 1 is made.
I call this minimum the individual's de facto valuation of good 2. Later I dene an individual's
de facto valuation of good 1, which takes into account the fact that the higher is the price paid
by the winner of good 1, the lower is this individual's de facto valuation of good 2.
I study a sealed-bid auction. First, good 1, which may be  or , is brought up for sale. Each
individual submits a bid for good 1; the bids are submitted simultaneously. The bid that an
individual of type t is able to make is constrained to be nonnegative. The bidder who submits
the higher bid obtains good 1. The price this bidder pays for the good depends on the price-
formation rule. The price that an individual of type t is able to pay is at most I(t). I assume
that there is an explicity penalty that constrains the bids so that the winning price is at most
the income of the winning bidder. (For example, if the bids and price-formation rule result in
a price that the winner is unable to pay, then the winner must forfeit the good and in addition
must pay a nancial penalty that ensures compliance with this assumption.) I assume that the
price-formation rule satises the following conditions. (Note that both rst- and second-price
rules satisfy these assumptions.)
(S1) Bidders are treated anonymously (the price of a good depends only on the collection of
bids and not on the identity of which bidder made which bid).
(S2) The price is non-decreasing in the bids.
After good 1 is sold, the winner's budget is reduced by the price paid for good 1 and the
winning bid is revealed. The individuals then simultaneously bid for good 2 (f;g = f1;2g);
the price that an individual of type t is able to pay is constrained to be at most I(t) minus any
payment the individual made for good 1.
I restrict attention to symmetric equilibria|that is, equilibria in which the bid of an indi-
vidual of type t at each stage depends on t and not on t's name. The fact that the loser in the
rst stage knows the winning bid and the equilibrium bidding function in the rst stage allows
the loser's beliefs about the winner's type to be updated. The inference problem complicates
the model substantially without apparently aecting the key incentives that I wish to explore,
so I make the simplifying assumption that once good 1 is allocated, the income of the winner of
good 1 and the price paid for good 1, in addition to the winning bid, are public knowledge.
It is well-known that the price-formation rule can aect the revenue of an auction. I want
to isolate the eect of the sequence of sale on the price of a good and therefore I restrict to
6parameters for which revenue is independent of the price-formation rule. In order to avoid
looking at special cases, I assume that, though the income of a bidder of type t is large enough
to pay either v(t) or v(t) for either good, it is not so large that any bidder is allocated both
goods in equilibrium. This property is satised when
max
s;t
v1(t)   v2(t) + I(s)
2
 min
t I(t)  max
t I(t)  min
s;t




for all t;s 2 [0;1]. This condition is explained in the next section.
Since the income, I(t) say, of the winner of good 1 and its price, p1 say, are known, the
remaining income, I(t)   p1, of the winner of good 1 is known. As shown in the next section
condition (2) implies that this remaining income is less than the good 1 winner's valuation for
good 2, so that I(t)   p1 < v2(t). It implies also that, once a bidder of type t wins good 1 from
a bidder of type s at a price p1, it is public knowledge that
minfI(t)   p1;v2(t)g = I(t)   p1 < v2(s)
That is, the good 1 winner's de facto valuation of good 2 and the fact that it is below the good
1 loser's valuation of good 2 are public knowledge
In the second stage, a single good is for sale. The auction in this stage diers from a standard
auction in that the players' ability to pay are limited by their incomes. Given that neither bidder
is allocated both goods in equilibrium and given that the de facto valuation of the good 1 winner
is known and is less than the valuation of the good 1 loser, under rst- and second-price-formation
rules (with suitable tie-breaking rules if necessary), the second period auction has an equilibrium
in which the bidder with the higher de facto valuation for good 2 obtains the good at a price
equal to the lower de facto valuation. For example, in the standard equilibrium under a second-
price rule, individuals bid their de facto valuations, and in the standard equilibrium under a
rst-price rule with a tie-breaking rule that favors the bidder with the higher de facto valuation,
each individual bids the lower de facto valuation. I restrict attention to price-formation rules
for which such an equilibrium exists. Further, I take this equilibrium to be the one that occurs.
That is, I assume that
(S3) Good 2 is sold to the bidder with the higher de facto valuation of good 2 at a price equal
to the lower de facto valuation of good 2.
Replacing the second stage of the game by the equilibrium payos in this equilibrium outcome
we obtain a Bayesian game G which is the game that I study. The strategy set of a bidder of
type t in G is [0;1), the set of feasible bids on good 1. I consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium
of G. That is, I look for a function B : [0;1] ! < that assigns a bid to each type with the
property that (B;B) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
7Suppose that, in equilibrium, a bidder of type t wins good 1 at the price p1. Then the other
bidder wins good 2 at the price13 p2 = I(t)   p1 so that
Revenue = income of the winner of good 1 (R)
Since the expected revenue equals the income of the winner of good 1 and since the price-
formation rule does not aect who wins good 1, the expected revenue does not depend on the
price-formation rule. Since the expected revenue does not depend on the price-formation rule
(as in an auction with a single good and no eective budget constraints), I am able to isolate
the pure eect of a change in the order of sale or the price-formation rule on the prices of goods
that occurs directly because of budget constraints. I note that the price-formation rule does not
aect who wins good 1.
I consider budget-constrained sequential auctions for which the price-formation rule satises
(S1), (S2) and (S3) and the valuation and income functions satisfy satisfy (1) and (2) so that
(R) is true.
3 The Sequence of Sale Aects Revenue and Prices
I start by dening the maximum amount that a bidder of type t is willing and able to pay
for good 1 when facing a bidder of type s. I call this maximum amount the bidder's de facto
valuation of good 1 when facing a bidder of type s and denote it by V (t;s). If a bidder of type
t wins good 1 at a price of p1 then the payo to this bidder is v1(t) p1. If good 1 is sold at the
price p1 to a bidder of type s, then the bidder of type t wins good 2 at the price I(s)   p1, and
thus obtains the payo v2(t)   (I(s)   p1). Hence the most that a bidder of type t is willing to
pay for good 1 when facing a bidder of type s is the amount p1 for which
v1(t)   p1 = v2(t)   (I(s)   p1) or p1 =
v1(t)   v2(t) + I(s)
2
Thus, the de facto valuation for good 1 of a bidder of type t when facing a bidder of type s is
V (t;s) =
v1(t)   v2(t) + I(s)
2
Suppose that f and g are real-valued functions on a domain S. I say that f is ordinally
equivalent (denoted OE) to g on S whenever the level curves and upper contour sets of f are
equal to those of g on S, that is, for all x;y 2 S, f(x) > f(y) if and only if g(x) > g(y). I
say that f is OE to g when f is OE to g on the entire domain. In particular, any strictly
increasing function is OE to any other strictly increasing function. I say that f is ordinally
13This follows from condition (2).
8reversed (denoted ORE) to g whenever there is one common set of level curves but the upper
contour set of one function is the lower contour set of the other function. In particular, any
strictly increasing function is ORE to any strictly decreasing function and any function f is
ORE to  f.
In a standard private valuation auction for one good, a bidding function that is OE to the
valuation function allocates the goods and money eciently. In a budget-constrained auction,
an equilibrium bidding function that is OE to v1  v2 allocates the goods and income eciently
(Theorem 2).
As discussed in the previous section, condition (2) ensures that no bidder is allocated both
goods in equilibrium. Since the price-formation rule does not aect who wins good 1, this
condition can be used to show that revenue is independent of the price-formation rule. The
argument is as follows. The assumption that v1(t) + v2(t)  I(t) implies that the minimum de
facto valuation for good 1 is less than or equal to the minimum valuation for good 1. Therefore,
any bidder is willing to bid up the price for good 1 to the minimum de facto valuation for good
1. That is, the price of good 1 is at least equal to this minimum. The last inequality of (2)
says that the dierence between the maximum possible income of the winner of good 1 and the
minimum de facto valuation for good 1 must be less than or equal to the minimum valuation of
good 2. That is, the residual income of the winner of good 1 must be less than the minimum
valuation of good 2. Thus, in equilibrium, each bidder who wins good 1 must lose good 2.
Moreover, the income of the winner of good 1 is depleted to below the winner's valuation of
good 2. It follows that the price of good 2 is the depleted income of the winner of good 1 so that
(R) is satised and so a bidding function that is OE to the income function maximizes auction
revenue.
In a standard auction of one good, a bidder is always willing and able to bid up to the bidder's
valuation. Therefore the unique ecient allocation is that in which the good is allocated to the
bidder with the highest valuation. An allocation of goods and income in a budget-constrained
auction is ecient if there are no Pareto improving trades. In contrast to the standard auction,
the willingness and ability of an individual to pay for a good depends not only on the bidder's
valuation for the good but also on the bidder's remaining income. In any auction allocation of
goods and income let t denote the type allocated good  and let R denote the money allocated
to type t for  2 (;).
Denition 1 The allocation ((t;R);(t;R)) is ecient if
v(t)  v(t) or R  v(t)
v(t)  v(t) or R  v(t)
9and
either v(t)   v(t)  v(t)   v(t)
or
R  v(t)   v(t)
R  v(t)   v(t)
We next answer two questions when all individuals use a common bidding function. When
is the resulting allocation ecient? When is the resulting revenue maximized? All proofs not
in the text are in the Appendix. Let M be the maximum revenue generated over all equilibria
of G under either order of sale.
Theorem 2 In any symmetric equilibrium of a budget-constrained sequential auction, the ex-
pected revenue is independent of the price-formation rule. M is at most equal to the revenue
generated by a common bidding function B(t) that is OE to I(t). Moreover, if the equilibrium
bidding function B(t) is OE to I(t), the expected revenue is higher than that generated by any
auction in which both goods are bundled and allocated simultaneously to one of the bidders.
Whenever the common bidding function B(t) is OE to v1(t)   v2(t), the allocation of goods and
money is ecient.
Corollary 3 If the bidding function B is OE to v1(t) v2(t) and I, then revenue equals M and
the goods are allocated eciently.
The above theorem and corollary hold for any auction form under consideration for which
the income constraints are binding. The proof here does not require the explicit calculation of
equilibrium bidding functions. The bidders know their valuations ex ante and the bidders may
bid on more than one good.
The next result implies that the law of one price need not hold for identical goods since
v1   v2 equals the zero function when the goods are identical.
Theorem 4 If the equilibrium bidding function B(t) is OE to v1(t) v2(t)+I(t) and I(t), then
the expected price of good 1 is less than that of good 2 whenever v2(w1)   v1(w1)  0, where w1
satises
v1(w1)   v2(w1) + I(w1) = E max(v1(t1)   v2(t1) + I(t1);v1(t2)   v2(t2) + I(t2)),
where E is the expectation operator.
It follows immediately that whenever each bidder considers the two goods to be identical,
the expected price of good 2 is higher than that of good 1 in such an equilibrium.
10Corollary 5 If v(t) = v(t) for all t and the equilibrium bidding function is OE to I, then the
expected price of good 2 is higher than that of good 1.
I now explore opportunities for arbitrage in this case.
Theorem 6 If v(t) = v(t) for all t and the equilibrium bidding function is OE to I, then the
expected price paid by a bidder in the auction is constant across bidders.
Theorems 4 and 6 imply that when v(t) = v(t) for all t and the bidding function is OE to
I, the expected price of good 1 is less than that of good 2 even though the expected price paid
is constant across bidders. To see how this result is possible, let p be the common expected
price that a bidder expects to pay in the auction. Since good 1 is allocated to the bidder with
the higher bid and good 2 is allocated to the bidder with the lower bid, the bidder whose type is
associated with the highest bid obtains good 1 for sure at a price of p, while the bidder whose
type is associated with the lowest bid obtains good 2 for sure at a price of p. Since the price
paid for a good is increasing in the bids, p is the highest price paid for good 1 and the lowest
price paid for good 2. A bidder whose type is associated with a bid between the highest and
lowest bids sometimes obtains good 1 for a price lower than p and sometimes obtains good 2 for
a price higher than p but on average obtains a good for a price of p. Thus, the price that any
single bidder expects to pay in the auction is constant across bidders even though the expected
price of good 1 is lower than that of good 2. A violation of the law of one price does not imply
opportunities for arbitrage.
4 The Expected Price of a Good Depends on the Price-
Formation Rule
Theorem 2 shows that the revenue can be aected by the sequence of sale when income varies
with type. It follows that, if income varies, then the sequence of sale can also aect the prices
of the goods. In fact, as shown below, the price-formation rule may aect the prices even in the
case that income is constant across types. In addition, the price-formation rule may aect the
way in which the price of a good depends on the sequence of sale.
Let B be an equilibrium bidding function. Consider the direct revelation game G(B) in which
each bidder's strategy set is the set [0;1] of types and the payo of type t when s is announced
is the payo obtained by type t in G when type t bids B(s). Since (B;B) is an equilibrium
of G, the \truthful" strategy prole in which each type t chooses t is an equilibrium of G(B).
I study equilibria of G(B) for any continuous bidding function B that is not constant on any
interval. Riley and Samuelson (1981) study a standard auction of one good and so consider
11continuous bidding functions that increase in a bidder's type. They nd that the equilibrium
price (and therefore revenue) is independent of the price-formation rule. By contrast, in a
budget-constrained sequential auction, even though the expected revenue is independent of
the price-formation rule since the price-formation rule does not aect who wins good 1, the
equilibrium price of good 1 varies with the rule.
Theorem 7 The equilibrium price of good 1 may depend on the price-formation rule.
Thus, even though the expected revenue and the winner of good 1 are independent of the
price-formation rule, the expected prices vary with the rule. Che and Gale (1998) show that
in a budget-constrained auction of one good, the expected price of the single good (which is
equivalent to revenue in this case) is higher under the 1st price rule than under the 2nd price
rule. In the auctions that we consider, revenue is constant across price rules but the price of
each good varies across rules.
5 Character of Bidding Function
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the equilibrium bidding function and the
functions v1   v2 + I and v1   v2. We rst show that if the equilibrium bidding function is
non-monotonic then the function v1   v2 is non-monotonic.
Theorem 8 If there exist sets b J1  [0;1] and b J2  [0;1]n b J1 and a function b x : b J1  ! b J2 for
which the equilibrium bidding function B satises B(t) = B(b x(t)) for t 2 b J1, then v1(t) v2(t) =
v1(b x(t))   v2(b x(t)) for t 2 b J1.
Denition 9 A continuous function f : X ! < is S-monotonic on a set T  X if
fz 2 X : f(z) = f(x)g
is a singleton for all x 2 T.
Note that a function that is strictly monotonic over the entire domain X is S-monotonic but
that strict monotonicity over a set T  X is not enough to guarantee S-monotonicity on T.
The level curve in X that passes through any element of the set T must be a singleton. While
the function f(x) = x(1   x)(2   x) is S-monotonic on [A;1) for A large enough, f strictly
increases but is not S-monotonic on [2;1).
Whenever a bidder of type t faces a bidder of type s for which B(t) > B(s), let P(t;s)
denote the price that the bidder of type t pays for good 1. Let D0
i denote the partial derivative
operator with respect to i; D00
ij, the second partial derivative with respect to i and j.
12Theorem 10 Suppose that v1  v2 +I is dierentiable and S-monotonic on [0;1]. There exists
an equilibrium bidding function that is OE to v1   v2 + I on [0;1] if D00
12P(t;s) = 0 for all (s;t)
and either one of D0
1P(t;s) and D0






We note that when P is not a member of the class of price rules assumed by Theorem 10,
then there may exist a monotonic B that is not OE to v1 v2+I.14 Theorems 8 and 10 indicate
the possibility of multiple bidding functions that dier with respect to allocation, revenue and
eciency.
Since the equilibrium bidding function need not be monotonic and since monotonicity aects
the equations that are necessary in equilibrium, we can use Theorems 8 and 10 and Corollary
3 to determine the feasible ordinal equivalence classes of equilibrium functions. For example,
if I(t) and v(t) increase while v(t) is constant, then the dierence in values increases in type
under the order (;). In this case, I is OE to v   v. Under either a 1st or 2nd price rule,
Theorem 10 implies that there exists an equilibrium bidding function that is OE to v   v, I
and v   v + I. Corollary 3 then implies that revenue is maximized and that the allocation
is ecient. Thus, one might expect that, in estate auctions, heavy equipment (for example,
ride-on lawn mowers that have a xed value) will be sold later than an item whose value may
depend more heavily on taste (for example, used bedspreads).
6 1st and 2nd Price Rules
I restrict attention to 1st and 2nd price-formation rules in this section. In general, more than one
equilibrium bidding function may exist and the equilibrium bidding functions may be neither
S-monotonic nor result in an ecient allocation. I provide a sucient condition for there to
exist an S-monotonic equilibrium bidding function under either price-formation rule.
Theorem 11 An S-monotonic equilibrium bidding function exists if v1 v2+I is S-monotonic.
I now provide a sucient condition for the existence of an equilibrium bidding function whose
allocation is ecient. This condition (that c, a function analogous to v1   v2 + I, is monotonic
on a set K whose construction depends on v1   v2) bears some resemblance to the sucient
condition in Theorem 11 but requires elaboration to state.
I begin by constructing the set K when v1   v2 is S-monotonically increasing whenever it
is S-monotonic. (The derivative of any real-valued dierentiable function f on [0;1] must have
14If P(s;t) = P(t;s) =
p
B(s)B(t), Equation (4) is solved by B(t) = (t + 1)
2 for which P(0;0) = 1 if either
v1(t)   v2(t) + I(t) = 3t2 + 6t + 1
2  1
2 and H(t) = t or if v1(t)   v2(t) + I(t) = 10
3 t2 + 8t   8
3t1=2 + 2  1:7802
and H(t) = t1=2.
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Figure 1: Two examples of the sets S and J. In each case, S is the union of the double line
segments on the x-axis and J is the union of the dotted line segments on the x-axis.
a common sign over any part of its domain over which it is S-monotonic. Suppose instead that
there exist two disconnected intervals S and T over which f is S-monotonic but the sign of f0
over S diers from that over T. The Intermediate Value Theorem then implies that there exists
x 2 [0;1]n(S [ T) and y 2 S[T for which f(x) = f(y). This contradicts the assumption that f
is S-monotonic on S and T.) Let S  [0;1] be the smallest closed set containing the domain on
which v1   v2 is S-monotonically increasing. We construct J  [0;1] to be an irreducible closed
set on which v1   v2 is monotonically increasing and
fv1(t)   v2(t) : t 2 S [ Jg = fv1(t)   v2(t) : t 2 [0;1]g
The set J is irreducible in the sense that discarding any of its interior members renders the
above equality to be false. If J 6= ;, then S [J & [0;1]. For each x 2 [0;1]n(S [ J) there exists
t 2 J for which v1(x)   v2(x) = v1(t)   v2(t). The restriction of v1   v2 to the set S [ J is said
to cover v1   v2 on the entire set [0;1] in that the set of image points is common.
Since there is a nite number of critical values of v1   v2, each of the sets S and J is the
union of a nite number of intervals. We construct J in an iterative fashion as follows15. Since
v1   v2 is a continuous function on [0;1], its maximum exists by the Extreme Value Theorem.
Let t0 be the point closest to 1 for which the maximum of v1   v2 occurs. In particular if the
maximum occurs for some t 2 S then continuity and the Intermediate Value Theorem imply
that it must occur for t0 = 1 in which case let ts(0) = t0 = 1. In this case let S0 = [ts(1);ts(0)]  S
be the largest interval in S that contains ts(0). If S0 = [0;1], then J = ;. If S0 6= [0;1], then
J 6= ; and we construct J0 as follows. Let tj(0) = ts(1) and let [tj(1);tj(0)] be the largest interval
on which v   v increases and for which (tj(1);tj(0)) \ S = ;. If instead, the maximum of
v1   v2 occurs for some t0 = 2 S, then t0  1. In this case let tj(0) = t0 and we construct J0 as
follows. Let J0 = [tj(1);tj(0)] be the largest interval on which v1   v2 increases and for which
(tj(1);tj(0)) \ S = ;.
15For some graphical examples, see Figure 1.
14We now provide the iterative step in the construction of the intervals of J. Suppose that we
have obtained the intervals
S0 = [ts(1);ts(0)];S1 = [ts(3);ts(2)];:::;SM = [ts(2M+1);ts(2M)]
contained in S and the intervals
J0 = [tj(1);tj(0)];J1 = [tj(3);tj(2)];:::;JN = [tj(2N+1);tj(2N)]
contained in J as above and that ta 2 (tk(2i+1);tk(2i)), tb 2 (tk(2i 1);tk(2i 2)) implies ta < tb for
k = s and i = 1;:::;M or k = j and i = 1;:::;N. If ts(2M+1) < tj(2N+1) then let tj(2N+2) = ts(2M+1)
and let JN+1 = [j(2N+3);j(2N+2)] be the largest interval on which v1  v2 increases and for which
(tj(2N+3);tj(2N+2)) \ S = ;. If tj(2N+1) < ts(2M+1) then there exists " > 0 for which either
(tj(2N+1)   ";tj(2N+1))  S or (tj(2N+1)   ";tj(2N+1)) \ int(S) = ;. In the former case, let
ts(2M+2) = tj(2N+1) and let [ts(2M+3);ts(2M+2)] be the largest interval in S that contains ts(2M+2).
In the latter case, let tj(2N+2) < tj(2N+1) be the point closest to tj(2N+1) for which
v1(tj(2N+2))   v2(tj(2N+2)) = v1(tj(2N+1))   v2(tj(2N+1))
and dene JN+1 = [tj(2N+3);tj(2N+2)] as the largest interval on which v1   v2 increases and for
which (tj(2N+3);tj(2N+2)) \ S = ;.
We stop the iterative process of constructing the sets S and J as soon as there exist M = M
and N = N such that
fv1(t)   v2(t) : t 2 [0;1]g =
n
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from right to left so that ti > ti+1 for ti 2 int(Ki);ti+1 2 int(Ki+1). Let K = [
M+N
i=0 Ki.
In the case that v1   v2 is S-monotonically decreasing whenever it is S-monotonic, the con-
struction of the sets starts at t0 closest to 0 at which v1   v2 reaches its maximum and the
construction of the sets progresses rightward with each new set being to the right of the already
constructed set and the sets K0;:::;KM+N represent the intervals from left to right. This ends
the construction of the set K.
Finally, we dene the function c, the analogue of v1   v2 + I in Theorem 11. Let
ci(t) =
P
x2X(t) (v1(t)   v2(t) + I(x))H0(x)jx0(t)j
P
x2X(t) H0(x)jx0(t)j
for i 2 Ki, i = 1;:::;M + N
15so that
c(t) = ci(t) for t 2 Ki, i = 1;:::;M + N
Theorem 12 If v1  v2 has a nite number of critical points on [0;1] and c(t) is monotonic on
K, then there exists an equilibrium bidding function whose allocation is ecient.
Corollary 13 If v1 v2 has at most a nite number of critical points on [0;1] and I is constant,
then there exists an equilibrium bidding function whose allocation is ecient.
The following corollary says that, if the value of one good is common to all types and the
value of the other good is correlated with income, then revenue is maximized when the commonly
valued good is sold last.
Corollary 14 If I and v are S-monotonically increasing on [0;1] and v is constant then,
there exists a unique equilibrium bidding function under the order of sale (;). This unique
equilibrium bidding function generates an ecient allocation and maximizes revenue among all
equilibrium bidding functions under either order of sale.
In general, there may exist multiple equilibrium bidding functions under both 1st and 2nd
price rules. These functions may be neither S-monotonic nor ecient but the next result shows
that for each equilibrium bidding function that exists under one rule, an order-equivalent bidding
function exists under the other rule.
Theorem 15 For each equilibrium bidding function By that exists under a ythprice rule, there
exists, under a 3 yth price rule, an equilibrium bidding function B3 y OE to By for y 2 f1;2g.
The following two theorems compare outcomes under 1st and 2nd price rules for bidding
functions that are OE. Theorem 16 generalizes a theoretical and experimental result for auctions
with complete information in Pitchik and Schotter (1988).
Theorem 16 If the equilibrium bidding function under a 1st price rule is OE to the equilibrium
bidding function under a 2nd price rule, then the expected price of good 1 is higher under a 2nd
price rule than it is under a 1st price rule.
Intuitively, under a 1st price rule, a bidder is worried about being allocated good 1 at a
relatively high price and so makes a relatively conservative bid. Under a 2nd price rule, a bidder
is worried about not winning the good at a relatively low price.
Theorems 17 and 20 and their Corollaries compare the price of a good when it is sold rst
to the price of the good when it is sold second under 1st and 2nd price rules.
16When income is an index of an individual's ability to use the good protably, then the
valuation for a good is correlated with income in which case it may be that v   v + I and
v   v + I are OE to I. In this case, we may compare the expected price of a good under one
sequence of sale with that under the other sequence of sale.
Theorem 17 If v   v + I, v   v + I, and I are OE to the equilibrium bidding functions
B; under order ; and B; under order ;, then the expected revenue is independent of
the sequence of sale and the expected price of a good is higher, the later it is sold.
The following two corollaries follow from Theorems 11 and 17.
Corollary 18 If v   v + I and v   v + I are OE and S-monotonic, then, for each order of
sale, there exists an equilibrium bidding function that is S-monotonic. Under any S-monotonic
equilibrium bidding function, the expected revenue is independent of the sequence of sale and the
expected price of a good is higher, the later it is sold.
Corollary 19 If v  v and I is S-monotonic, then for each order of sale there exists an
equilibrium bidding function that is S-monotonic. Among all outcomes associated with an S-
monotonic equilibrium bidding function, the allocation is ecient, the expected revenue is in-
dependent of the sequence of sale, and the expected price of a good is higher, the later it is
sold.
If income varies widely relative to the value of either good then the expected price of the
good is higher the later it is sold.
Under each price rule, the last theorem compares the expected price of a good under the
two dierent sequences of sale. While it always true that v   v is ORE to v   v it may not
be the case that v   v + I and v   v + I share any equivalence. We would like to compare
the prices of goods as a function of the sequence but to do so we need to keep revenue constant
in order to nd the direct eect of the order of sale on the dierence in price. In the case that
v   v + I is ORE to v   v + I, the expected revenue is independent of the sequence only if
the income is independent of type. If income is constant across types then v   v + I is ORE
to v  v+I. In this case, the expected prices of the goods depend on the sequence of sale and
on the price-formation rules as follows.16
Theorem 20 If I(t) = I is constant and v1  v2 has a nite number of critical values, then for
each order of sale and for each price rule, there exists a unique equilibrium bidding function. In
16The last part of this result generalizes theoretical and experimental complete information results in Pitchik
and Schotter (1988).
17each case, the unique bidding function is OE to v1 v2+I and allocates goods eciently. Under
each price rule, the bidding function under one order of sale is ORE to the bidding function
under the other order of sale. In addition, (1) under a 1st price rule the expected price of a good
is higher the later it is sold, and (2) under a 2nd price rule the expected price of a good is higher
the earlier it is sold.
The reason the last part of this result diers from Theorems 4 and 17 is as follows. Because
the variation in the dierences in valuation for each good are essentially dwarfed by that of
income in Theorems 4 and 17, income plays the following role in determining the allocation of
each good. The individual with the higher income obtains good 1 under either sequence and
under any price-formation rule. Thus, the results do not depend on the price-formation rule and
the allocation varies with the sequence. However, in Theorem 20, the variation in the valuation
of good  say dwarfs that of good  and income combined so that both the valuation and
position (whether rst or second) of good  play a role in determining the price of each good.
In this case, under any price-formation rule and under any sequence, the individual who values
good  more highly obtains good .
Now suppose that the value of one good, say , varies with a bidder's type while the income
and the value of the other good, say , is independent of the bidder's type. Further suppose
that the values share a common mean. In this case, Theorem 20 implies that if the goods are
similar, then the price of a good decreases with its position in the order of sale when the auction
proceeds under a 2nd price rule. Under a 2nd price rule, a bidder is able to bid up the price of
good 1 in order to obtain good 2 at a lower price than otherwise.
7 Robustness
In this section I show that the sequence of sale may aect revenue and/or prices when the
assumptions of the model are relaxed. I provide three examples below.
I rst consider a 2nd price auction in the presence of n > 2 bidders who each have a common
income that is less than the valuation of either good and who each highly value good  relative to
good  and income. Specically, I(t) = I and v(t) > (n 1)(v(t) I)+I > v(t) I > I > 0
for t 2 [0;1]. Since I < v(t) < v(t) for all t 2 [0;1], no bidder obtains more than one good in
equilibrium. I want to compare the price of each good if the order of sale is (;) to that when
it is (;). If the order is (;) then each individual's equilibrium bidding function for good
 is17 B(t) = I so that the expected equilibrium price of good  is I. So, when the goods are
sold in the order (;), the price of good  is I; that of good  is I since n > 2. If instead,
17The payo from a bid of I is (v(t) I)=n+(v(t) I)(n 1)=n(n 1). The payo from bidding less than
I results is (v(t)   I)=(n   1).
18the goods are sold in the order (;) then the expected price of  is less than I. The reason
is as follows. Suppose that the expected price of  is I. In this case, at least two individuals
bid I. Let m  2 be the number of individuals who bid I. The payo to each who bids I is
(v(t)   I)=m + [(m   1)=m](v(t)   I)=(n   1) while the payo to anyone who bids just less
than I is (v(t)   I)=(n   1). By assumption v(t)   I > (n   1)(v(t)   I), so that it cannot
be that m  2 bidders bid I in equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium price of  must be less than
I. It follows that when the goods are sold in the order (;) the expected equilibrium price of
 is less than I, as claimed. Thus, revenue is highest when  is sold rst and the price of 
increases with its position in the order of sale. The reason is that when  is sold second, there
are always at least two individuals who are willing and able to pay I for  so that competition
is intense; when  is sold rst, competition is not as intense since each bidder wants to have
income to bid on good .
The above example illustrates that the revenue and prices of goods may depend on the
sequence in which the goods are sold even when there are many bidders and only two goods. In
the example, revenue is maximized when the more valuable good is sold rst.
I now analyse the model when there are asymmetries among the bidders as well as changes
to the assumptions on income relative to valuations so that a bidder may obtain both goods in
equilibrium under a 2nd price rule. Let's assume that the valuations of the two goods are xed
such that v(t) = A, v(t) = B < A. Suppose that there are two pools of bidders and that
bidder 1 has enough income to buy both goods whereas bidder 2 is relatively and absolutely
poor. Specically, let's assume that I1(t) 2 [c1;d1] and that I2(t) = I where A > d1 > c1 > 2I >
B > I. If the goods are auctioned in the order (;) then each bidder is willing to pay at least
I for  so that bidder 1 obtains good  at a price of I in equilibrium. Once good  is allocated,
each bidder is willing to pay at least I for good . Since bidder 1 has more than double the
income of bidder 2 and since good  is relatively highly valued, bidder 1 obtains both goods in
equilibrium when the order of sale is (;). The equilibrium price of each good equals I and
the equilibrium revenue is 2I. However, when the goods are sold in the order (;), bidder 1's
de facto valuation for good  is B=2 < I. Bidder 2 is willing to pay up to I for good  since
otherwise, bidder 2 receives nothing. Thus, under the order , bidder 2 obtains good  and
bidder 1 obtains good . The equilibrium price of  is B=2 and that of  is I   B=2. The
equilibrium revenue is I. In summary, the revenue is higher when  (the more highly valued
good) is sold rst; the price of good  (the good that is allocated to the rich bidder independent
of its order of sale) is higher when  is sold rst; the price of good  (the good that is allocated to
the stronger bidder only when it is sold second) is higher when  is sold second. That revenue is
higher when  is sold rst is consistent with the implications of Theorem 2 in which the revenue
is higher when good 1 is sold to the richer bidder. In Theorem 20, the allocation of the goods
19is independent of the price rule and the price of a good is higher the earlier it is sold under
a 2nd price rule. In our example,  is allocated to the richer bidder independent of the order
of sale so that competition for good  and its price are higher the earlier it is sold. That the
price of good  is higher when sold rst in our example is therefore consistent with Theorem 20.
Under the assumptions of Theorem 17 the price of a good is higher the later it is sold when the
competition for the good is higher the later it is sold. In our example,  is allocated to the rich
bidder only when it is sold second so that competition for  is higher when it is sold second.
That the price of good  is higher when sold second is consistent with Theorem 17.
Thus, even when one bidder is relatively strong (in the example, the bidder whose income is
twice that of the other bidder is relatively strong), revenue and price may depend on the order
of sale. Whether the price of a good increases or decreases with its position in the order of sale
depends on how the order of sale aects the competition for the good. When good 1 goes to
the stronger bidder independent of the order of sale, then there is no disadvantage in obtaining
good 1 because, if there were, the stronger bidder would just mimic the weaker bidder. In this
case, the price of a good must increase with its position in the order of sale. When a designated
good goes to the stronger bidder, then the competition for the good is higher when it is sold
rst and so price decreases with its position in the order of sale.
Lastly, I consider an example in which a bidder's type is two dimensional and each dimen-
sion is distributed independently. Suppose that the valuation for each good is common and
distributed uniformly on [6;7] and income is independently distributed uniformly on [7;8]. An
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20Thus, even when the valuations are distributed independently from income, when the values are
identical, the price of a good is aected by its order of sale. As in Theorem 17 and Corollary
19, there exists a bidding function that is OE to v1   v2 + I and I, and the expected price of
good 2 is higher than that of good 1. As in Theorem 16, the expected price of good 1 is higher
under a second price rule than under a rst price rule. As in Theorem 7 the equilibrium price
of good 1 depends on the price rule.
8 Conclusion
In the presence of budget constraints there may exist multiple symmetric equilibrium bidding
functions and they may dier with respect to allocation, prices and revenue. Prices depend on
the price-formation rule. In addition, even in the absence of arbitrage possibilities, identical
goods may fetch dierent prices. The sequence of sale aects the expected revenue through the
allocation of the goods. Whenever the winner of good 1 is the bidder with the higher income,
expected revenue is maximized. Under 1st and 2nd price rules, whenever, independent of the
sequence, the winner of good 1 is the bidder with the higher income, the expected price of a
good is no lower the later it is sold. Intuitively, if good 1 is always sold to the stronger bidder,
then there can be no disadvantage in winning good 1. This happens when the goods are similar
enough and income is relatively variable. By contrast, if, independent of the sequence, the
stronger bidder is allocated a designated good (which may be good 1 or good 2), the expected
price of a good decreases with its position in the order of sale under a 2nd price rule and increases
under a 1st price rule. Intuitively, under a 2nd price rule, there is an incentive for the loser of
good 1 to bid up its price, depleting the winner's income, in order to obtain good 2 at a lower
price. Thus, under a 2nd price rule, when the allocation of the goods is independent of the
sequence, the expected price of a good declines with its position in the order of sale. Under a
1st price rule, a higher bid of the loser does not aect the price of good 1 and may adversely
aect the payo of the loser so that bids are more conservative.
Basically, the price of a good is higher whenever competition for the good is higher. If
bidders are drawn from populations that dier according to income, then goods that are always
allocated to the richer bidder fetch a higher price when sold rst. Goods that are sold to the
richer bidder only when sold second fetch a higher price when sold second.
Other links between the goods can have the same eect as do budget-constraints. For
example, if rms with limited plant capacities bid on projects let by the government, the results
of letting any given contract will depend on the available capacity of rms in the industry. The
results are not qualitatively dierent in this case.
219 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: By (R), expected revenue equals the expected income of the winner of good
1 so that revenue is highest if the winner of good one has the higher income. If B(t) is OE to I(t)
under any price-formation rule then good 1 is allocated to the bidder with the higher income
so that, by (R), the expected revenue is the expected value of the higher income so that, in the
case of multiple equilibria, the expected revenue is highest if the equilibrium bidding function is
OE to the income function. Thus, the expected revenue is independent of the price-formation
rule since the winner of good 1 is unaected by the price-formation rule.
We now compare revenue in the revenue-maximizing sequential auction to that in an auction
in which both goods are sold simultaneously. When both goods are sold simultaneously to one
of the bidders, rather than sequentially, an individual t's de facto valuation of holding both
goods is I(t) by assumption (1). Thus, the auction in which both goods are sold simultaneously
is equivalent to an auction in which one good is sold whose value to individual t is I(t). The
result follows since no auction of a single good can yield an expected equilibrium revenue equal
to the expected value of the highest valuation (Riley and Samuelson [1981]).
In the case that the bidding function is OE to v1   v2, the individual who obtains good 1
(say type t1) has the higher v1   v2 while the individual who obtains good 2 (say type t2) has
the lower. By assumption, in equilibrium, the remaining income R1 of the individual t1 is less
than v2(t2), the valuation for good 2 of individual t2. Thus, if the bidding function B is OE
to v1   v2, then the allocation is ecient. In the case of multiple equilibria, the allocation is
ecient only if the bidding function is OE to the dierence in the value functions.
Proof of Theorem 4: The de facto valuation of good 1 for a bidder of type t who faces a bidder
of type s is V (t;s) = (v1(t)   v2(t) + I(s))=2. Since B is OE to v1   v2 + I and I, the average
price that a bidder of type t expects to pay for good 1 is strictly less than bidder t's critical
value v(t) = (v1(t)   v2(t) + I(t))=2. In this case the expected price of good 1 must be strictly
less than the critical value of the expected winner. Thus, the expected price of good 1 must be
strictly less than (v1(w1)   v2(w1) + I(w1))=2. However, by (R), the expected revenue is I(w1).
Thus, the expected price of good 2 must be strictly greater than (v2(w1)   v1(w1) + I(w1))=2
which proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 6: If the other bidder uses the equilibrium strategy B(t), let (x) be the
probability that a bidder of type t who pretends to be type x wins good 2 and let e P(x) be the
expected payment made by such a bidder. The expected payo (t;x) of such a bidder equals
the expected benet minus the expected payment
(t;x) = v1(t)(1   (x)) + v2(t)((x))   e P(x)
22In equilibrium, D0
2(t;x) equals 0 when x = t so that
 (v1(t)   v2(t))
0(t) = e P
0(t) (3)
Since v1(t) = v2(t), (3) implies e P 0(t) = 0 for all t as required.
In order to prove the next Theorem, let P (x) denote the expected price that an individual
(who claims to be of type x) pays for good 1 and P(x) denote the expected price that an
individual (who claims to be of type x) pays for good 2. Thus, e P(t;x) = P (x) + P(x). Let
P(x;z) denote the price that an individual who claims to be of type x pays for good 1 if the
other individual claims to be of type z.
Let 1(t;x) be the set of opponents who lose good 1. Let 2(t;x) denote the set of opponents
who lose only good 2. By assumption, no bidder wins both goods in equilibrium so that, in
equilibrium, 12(t;t) = ? (which implies that 1(t;t) + 2(t;t) = 1) and v2(s) > I(s)   P(s;t)
for s 2 2(t;t). Thus, if s 2 1(t;x), then individual t obtains good 1 at the price P(x;s); if
instead s 2 2(t;x) then individual t loses good 1 and obtains good 2 at the price I(s) P(s;x).
In equilibrium, the expected payo must be maximized when x = t. If s(x) is an upper end
point of an interval in 1(t;x) that varies with x then s(x) is a lower end point of an interval in
2(t;x) so that the derivative (evaluated at x = t) of
R
1(t;x) H0(s)ds with respect to x equals the
the negative of the derivative (evaluated at x = t) of
R
2(t;x) H0(s)ds with respect to x. Thus, in
equilibrium,
e P(t) = P









Proof of Theorem 7: In equilibrium, P(s;t) = P(t;t) for all endpoints s of intervals in 2(t;t)







































































23The result follows since the right-hand side of (5) depends on the price-formation rule.18
































































If instead of t varying in b J2, we have t varying in b J1 and b x(t) varying in b J2, we can rewrite







































































However, by denition of b x(t), 2(t;t) = 2(b x(t);b x(t)), 1(t;t) = 1(b x(t);b x(t)), P(s;t) =
P(s;b x(t)), D0
2P(s;t) = D0
2P(s;b x(t))b x0(t), P(t;s) = P(b x(t);s), D0
1P(t;s) = D0
2P(b x(t);s)b x0(t),



























18The analog of equation (5) in the standard one good auction is P0(t) = v(t)H0(t) which is independent of
the price formation rules.
































Thus, (6) and (10) must hold for t 2 b J1 which implies the result.
Proof of Theorem 10: We look for an equilibrium bidding function B that is monotonically
increasing on [0;1] so that when setting up equation (4), 2(t;t) = (t;1), 1(t;t) = (0;t) and
(t) = 1   H(t). Let D denote the total derivative so that D0
1P(t;t)+ D0
2P(t;t) = DP(t;t).
If B(t) solves (4), then, by construction, bidder t gains most by bidding according to B(t)
rather than according to B(s) for any s 6= t. I rst show that there is no incentive for any bidder
to bid outside the range of bids. Continuity of the payo function and the fact that the payo
function decreases as the distance between the out-of-equilibrium bid and the set of equilibrium
bids increases imply that no bidder can gain by deviating, proving the result. It remains to show
that there exists a solution to (4) that is monotonically increasing for which no bidder obtains
both goods in equilibrium. If the bidding function satises P(0;0)  (v1(0)   v2(0) + I(0))=2,
condition (2) would be sucient to imply that no bidder obtains both goods in equilibrium.
Let D denote the total derivative. In the case that one of D0
1P(t;s) or D0
2P(s;t) equals
zero, then, since D0
1P(t;t)+ D0
2P(t;t) = DP(t;t) and D00
12(t;t) = D00
21(t;t) = 0, (4) implies that
there exists a monotonically increasing B that is an equilibrium bidding function if there exists
a monotonically increasing bidding function for which
P(0;0)  min
s;t2[0;1]
v1(t)   v2(t) + I(s)
2
and either
DP(t;t)(1   H(t))   2P(t;t)H











































Since P(t;t) is a strictly increasing function of B(t) and v0
1(s)   v0
2(s) + I0(s) > 0, there exists




t (1   H(s))2(v0
1(s)   v0
2(s) + I0(s))ds





















2 +I0 > 0 on (0;1), D00
12(t;t) = D00
21(t;t) = 0 and one of D0
1P(t;s) or D0
2P(s;t)
equals zero, DP > 0 for t 2 (0;1). Thus, since P(t;t) is a strictly increasing function of B(t),
v0
1(s) v0
2(s)+I0(s) > 0 on [0;1] implies that there exists a monotonically increasing equilibrium
bidding function.
In the case that D00
12(t;t) = D00




 > 0, and
D0
1P(t;t)+ D0
































































26Since P(t;t) is a strictly increasing function of B(t), v0
1(s)   v0
2(s) + I0(s) > 0 this implies that





















v1(t)   v2(t) + I(s)
2
so that again v0
1(s)   v0
2(s) + I0(s) > 0 on [0;1] implies that there exists an equilibrium bidding
function B that is monotonically increasing on [0;1]. Analogous arguments show that the results
remain when v1(s)   v2(s) + I(s) is S-decreasing on [0;1].
Proof of Theorem 11: Under rst price rules, D2P(t;s) = 0 and under second price rules,
D1P(t;s) = 0. Thus, D12P(t;s) = 0 and the result follows from Theorem 10.
Proof of Theorem 12: We show that there exists an equilibrium bidding function that is OE






denote the probability that player t 2 Ki  S [ J obtains good 2. Let X(t) represent the set
of points in [0;1] for which v1 (x)   v2 (x) = v1(t)   v2(t). If t 2 int(S), X(t) = ftg where int
denotes the interior. If t 2 int(J), then X(t) % ftg. In this case, as t varies so does each point
in X(t). We abuse notation and let x 2 X(t) stand for a point and also for a function that
varies with t whenever t is not a critical point of v1   v2. In this case, the sign of x0(t) equals
that of v0
1 (x)   v0
2 (x) for x 6= t. Let jzj denotes the absolute value of z. Since v1   v2 increases









Since v1  v2 is maximized at t0, 0(t0) = 0. We note that i(t) > 0 at all other right-hand
endpoints of Ki, i = 1;:::;M + N.
We provide the proof explicitly under a second price rule in the case that v1   v2 is S-
monotonically increasing whenever it is S-monotonic. We begin construction of B with a dier-
ential equation on K0. In this case, since v1 (x)   v2 (x) = v1(t)   v2(t) for x 2 X(t), the ODE







with initial condition B(t0) = c(t0)=2:









for t 2 [t1;t0] = K0. The proof that B0(t) > 0 for t 2 int(K0) follows the exact reasoning oered
in the proof of Theorem 10 with c0 in the current proof taking on the role of v1   v2 + I in the
previous proof so that the sign of B0 > 0 as required.
We now derive B for the iterative step. Suppose that B has been derived and that B0(t) > 0
for t 2 [i=k





















where r(t2r) = r 1(t2r 1) and cr(t2r+1) = cr+1(t2r+2) on Kr for r = 0;:::;k. We now derive
B for t 2 Kk+1 and show that B0 > 0 on Kk+1.
Since v1(t2k+2)   v2(t2k+2) = v1(t2k+1)   v2(t2k+1), and since B is OE to v   v, the ODE


























































for t 2 Kk+1. Using integration by parts and that facts that c increases, r(t2r) = r 1(t2r 1)


































r > 0 for r = 0;:::;k + 1, 0
k+1 < 0, t2r+1 < t2r, t 2 [t2k+3;t2k+2].
By construction, for x 2 X(t)  [0;1]n(S [ J), there exists t 2 J for which v1(x)   v2(x) =
v1(t)   v2(t) so that we may extend B letting B(x) = B(t). In this case, B0(x(t))x0(t) = B0(t)
for x 2 X(t) as required.
Thus far, we have obtained the unique bidding function that is OE to v1   v2 and that
satises the appropriate ODE (and initial condition) required to guarantee that, for t 2 [ti+1;ti]
bidding B(t) is best among bids B(s) for t 2 [ti+1;ti]. It remains to show that, for any bidder
t 2 [ti+1;ti] say, bidding any bid b = B(s) for s 2 Kr for r 6= i or b = 2 fB(s) : s 2 S [ Jg is
weakly dominated by bidding B(t).








(v(t)   I(u) + B(s))H
0(u)du
If all types bid according to B, then @(s;s)=@s = 0. Now, suppose that s 2 J [ S, then
B(s) < B(t) implies @(t;s)=@s > @(s;s)=@s since v(s)   v(s) < v(t)   v(t) whenever
B(s) < B(t) and B(s) > B(t) implies that @(t;s)=@s < @(s;s)=@s since v(s)   v(s) >
v(t) v(t) whenever B(s) > B(t). Thus, bidder t prefers to bid B(t) rather than B(s) for any
s 2 S[J, s 6= t. Continuity of the payo guarantees that bidder t prefers to bid B(t) rather than
b < mins2S[J B(s) or b > maxB(s) since the payo function increases in bids b < mins2S[J B(s)
and decreases in bids b > maxB(s). One can prove the theorem under a 1st price rule either
analogously or by appealing to Theorem 15.
Proof of Corollary 13: c(t) is monotonic on K so that Theorem 12 implies the result.
Proof of Corollary 14: Eciency, existence, uniqueness and revenue maximization follows
from the proof of Theorems 12, 11, 8 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 15: As the reasoning is entirely analogous in the two cases, we prove the
result starting with an equilibrium bidding function that exists under a 2nd price rule. Begin by
letting
B1(t) = B2(t)  
R




as stated at the end of the proof of Lemma 22. It is immediate from reversing the Proof of
Lemma 22 that B1 is an equilibrium bidding function under a 1st price rule. Since the sign of
r
0 equals that of B0
2 and by denition of r, it is also immediate that B1 is OE to B2.
The following lemmas are used to prove Theorems 16, 17, and 20.
Lemma 21 Let W : [0;1]  ! [0;1] be onto and continuous. Let b K be the union of intervals
over which the cover of W is strictly monotonic on b K. Let W  1(0) = C, W  1(1) = D where
29C < D or D < C are the endpoints of b K. Let
F(t) = W(t)lnW(t)  
(2W(t)   1)2
4
G(t) = 2(1   W(t))







, G(t)   
1
2
































Proof. We rst note that F(C) =  1=4 = F(D), G(C) =  1=2 = G(D).
F 0(t) = W 0(t)(lnW(t) + 2   2W(t)) = W 0(t)M(t)












0(t)(2ln(1   W(t)) + 1)
Since W 0 > 0 if and only if C < D, as t increases along (C;D)\ b K, F(t) decreases then increases
while G(t) increases then decreases which proves the rst pair of results.






























































30Let L be ORE to W and W 0 > 0. C < D and L0 < 0 implies the last result.
Given any bidding function B and its associated probability r(t) = 1   (t), there is a
monotonic cover of B. Denote by b K the closure of union of intervals over which the cover is
strictly monotonic and let c = r
 1(0), D = r
 1(1) denote the end-points of b K. Either the
cover is strictly increasing over b K and C < D or the cover is strictly decreasing over b K and
D < C. There may be gaps in b K but, by nature of a cover, the values of the bidding function
form a continuous range as t ranges over b K. Below, the subscripts indicate the price rule.
Lemma 22 If the equilibrium bidding function under a 1st price rule is OE to that under a 2nd
price rule, then
B1(t) = B2(t)  
R




Proof. Since B1 and B2 are OE there are OE monotonic covers of B1 and B2 with a common
associated b K and r. Since r(t) = 1   (t), (4) implies
B
0
2(t)(1   r(t))   2B2(t)r


















which implies that, for t 2 b K,
B1(t) = B2(t)  
R




The next two Lemmas restrict to 1st (denoted by a = 0) and 2nd price rules (denoted by
a = 1). Let the subscripts on B denote the order of sale.
Lemma 23 If va   v + I, v   v + I and I are each OE to the equilibrium bidding function
under order ; and under order ; then, for t 2 b K
B;(t) + B;(t) = I(t)   a
R
(D;t)\ b K(1   r(s))2I0(s)ds
(1   r(t))2   (1   a)
R




Proof. Since B; and B: are OE, the associated b J and  are common. Since r(t) =
1   (t), (4) and the fact that I is OE to both bidding functions imply
B
0
;(t)(a(1   r(t))   (1   a)r(t))   2B;(t)r




;(t)(a(1   r(t))   (1   a)r(t))   2B;(t)r









(a(1   r(t))   (1   a)r(t))   2(B;(t) + B;(t))r
0(t) =  2I(t)r
0(t)
31Lemma 24 If va v+I is ORE to v v+I and each bidding function is OE to its associated
critical value v(t) then, if I(t) = I












for t 2 b K
Proof. Since r(t) = 1   (t), (4) implies that
B
0
;(t)(a(1   r;(t))   (1   a)r;(t))   2B;(t)r
0





;(t)(a(1   r;(t))   (1   a)r;(t))   2B;(t)r
0
;(t) =  (v(t)   v(t) + I)r
0
;(t)



















;(t) + (1   a)B
0
;(t)
which implies the result where r;(C) = 0, r;(D) = 1, C;D 2 b K where r; is OE to B;
on b K which is ORE to B; on b K.
Proof of Theorem 16: By assumption, there is a common r and b J. Since the expected price


























































































Proof of Theorem 17: SinceI is OE to the equilibrium bidding functions B; and B; the
expected income of the winner of good one is independent of the sequence of sale so that the
expected revenue is independent of the sequence of sale. Since the sum of the expected prices
of the goods equals expmaxfI(t1);I(t2)g, the dierence exp;
  expp;
 in the expected price




































































































Proof of Corollary 18: Theorem 11 therefore implies existence of an S-monotonic equilibrium
bidding function. Theorem 17 then implies the result.
Proof of Corollary 19: Existence follows from Theorem 11. Eciency follows from the fact
that v = v. The remainder of the theorem follows from Theorem (17).
33Proof of Theorem 20: Uniqueness follows from Theorems (8) and (10). Existence follows
from Theorem (12) since v1   v2 is OE to v1   v2 + I. I now prove points (1) and (2). WLOG,
I focus on  and assume B; strictly increases on b J.
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